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Abstract This paper is about Poincare´’s view of the foundations of geometry. Ac-
cording to the established view, which has been inherited from the logical positivists,
Poincare´, like Hilbert, held that axioms in geometry are schemata that provide im-
plicit definitions of geometric terms, a view he expresses by stating that the axioms
of geometry are “definitions in disguise.” I argue that this view does not accord well
with Poincare´’s core commitment in the philosophy of geometry: the view that ge-
ometry is the study of groups of operations. In place of the established view I offer
a revised view, according to which Poincare´ held that axioms in geometry are in
fact assertions about invariants of groups. Groups, as forms of the understanding,
are prior in conception to the objects of geometry and afford the proper definition
of those objects, according to Poincare´. Poincare´’s view therefore contrasts sharply
with Kant’s foundation of geometry in a unique form of sensibility. Accordingly, ax-
ioms are not definitions in disguise because they themselves implicitly define their
terms, but rather because they disguise the definitions which imply them. According
to my interpretation, axioms are not definitions in disguise because they themselves
implicitly define their terms, but rather because they disguise the definitions which
imply them.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I will offer an interpretation of Henri Poincare´’s views on the founda-
tions of mathematics, revolving around a revised assessment of his understanding
of geometry. My interpretation of Poincare´ on the foundations of geometry departs
from the established view, according to which he held that axioms implicitly de-
fine geometric terms. In the following section I will present the established view
and briefly summarize the textual evidence for it. Subsequently I will explain and
provide evidence for my revised view. According to the established view, Poincare´
regarded the axioms of geometry as uninterpreted schemata, providing implicit def-
initions of geometrical terms. I will contend that Poincare´ in fact maintained that
the axioms of geometry are properly understood as assertions about invariants of
geometric groups.
This paper extends and clarifies the interpretation of Poincare´’s philosophy of ge-
ometry that has recently been articulated by David Stump and Gerhard Heinzmann.
In particular, I disagree with part of Stump and Heinzmann’s Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy article on Poincare´; viz., the claim that “concerning pure and
applied geometry, Poincare´ holds the modernist-sounding view that we have no pre-
axiomatic understanding of geometric primitives” (Heinzmann and Stump, 2014,
§3.2).1 I will argue that according to Poincare´ we do indeed have a pre-axiomatic un-
derstanding of geometric primitives. The revised view that I will defend aligns well
with Michael Friedman’s interpretation of Poincare´’s conventionalism, which em-
phasizes the group theoretical perspective that is key to comprehending Poincare´’s
comments on geometry (Friedman, 1997). The paper contributes to the literature
primarily by directly addressing the established view, articulating an alternative and
showing how that alternative is better supported; secondarily, I will clarify the re-
lationship of Poincare´’s views to those of his contemporaries by showing that, con-
trary to Russell’s perception, the Poincare´-Russell polemics concerned not whether
geometrical primitives should receive nominal definitions but rather what are the
primitives, and also by emphasizing the differences between Poincare´ and Hilbert.
2 The established view
According to to the established view, Poincare´ understood geometric axioms to be
uninterpreted schemata that define mathematical concepts without reference to in-
tuited objects. Accordingly, many have thought that Poincare´ held that geometrical
concepts are to be defined by implicit definition. This view of Poincare´ can be found
expressed by the logical positivists, and it influenced their understanding of his con-
ventionalism. Moritz Schlick wrote:
1 My interpretation, however, is strongly influenced by Heinzmann, and in particular on his view
of Poincare´’s account of mathematical reasoning as founded on the “capability to follow an action
schema” (Heinzmann, 1998, p. 47).
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To define a concept implicitly is to determine it by means of its relations to other concepts.
But to apply such a concept to reality is to choose, out of the infinite wealth of relations in
the world, a certain group or complex and to embrace this complex as a unit by designating
it with a name. By suitable choice it is always possible under certain circumstances to obtain
an unambiguous designation of the real by means of the concept. Conceptual definitions and
coordinations that come into being in this fashion we call conventions (using this term in the
narrower sense, because in the broader sense, of course, all definitions are agreements). It
was Henri Poincare´ who introduced the term convention in this narrower sense into natural
philosophy; and one of the most important tasks of that discipline is to investigate the nature
and meaning of the various conventions found in natural science (Schlick and Blumberg,
1974, p. 71).
Rudolf Carnap, too, mentioned Poincare´’s philosophy of science in the context of his
discussion of “structural definite descriptions,” which he relates to Hilbert’s implicit
definitions, suggesting that he too viewed Poincare´’s conception of geometry as
aligned with the idea of implicit definitions (Carnap, 1969, p. 27-30).2 According
to the established view, convention enters into science through the coordination of
axiom schema to reality.
More recently, Stewart Shaprio, in his book defending in re structuralism, situates
Poincare´ as a proponent of implicit definitions of geometrical concepts by uninter-
preted axiom schemata (Shapiro, 2000, p. 154-156). Shapiro draws his interpreta-
tion from the influential work of Alberto Coffa, who parallels the Poincare´-Russell
polemics on the foundations of geometry with the Hilbert-Frege correspondence,
by aligning Poincare´ and Hilbert on the satisfactoriness of implicit definitions and
Russell and Frege on the demand for nominal definitions (Coffa, 1993). While it is
true that Russell understood Poincare´ to be rejecting the need for nominal defini-
tions of geometric primitives, on my view this is a misunderstanding on Russell’s
part: Poincare´ was arguing that Russell had the wrong primitives and not that there
wasn’t any need for primitives. Here is how Coffa presented the basic issue at stake
in that debate:
[Russell’s] reasoning [against Poincare] involved an appeal to a principle that may be called
the thesis of semantic atomism. . . This principle says that if a sentence S is to convey infor-
mation (or, as Russell or Frege would put it, to express a proposition), then its grammatical
units must have a meaning before they join their partners in S (Coffa, 1993, p. 131)...
Poincare’s conventionalism was based on the idea that in order to understand geometry,
one must stand Russell’s argument on its head: Since geometric primitives do not acquire
their meaning prior to their incorporation into the axiomatic claims, such axioms do not
express propositions in Frege’s or Russell’s sense (Coffa, 1993, p. 133).
To put a fine point on it, I will show that according to Poincare´ the geometric “prim-
itives” in question do in fact acquire meaning prior to their incorporation in typical
axiomatizations, precisely because they are not, after all, primitive.
Though I will be offering an alternative, there can be no doubt that there is a
textual basis for following the positivists, Coffa, Shapiro, and others in accepting
the established view. The established view is supported by three pillars:
2 However, Carnap views Poincare´ as not having gone far enough, since, according to Carnap
Poincare´ conceived of science as concerned with relations rather than taking the further step of
saying science is concerned with the Russellian structure-type of a relation.
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1. The established view provides an appealing and direct explanation of Poincare´’s
statement that axioms are definitions in disguise.
2. The established view also explains why Poincare´ concurs with Hilbert’s claim
that mathematics is constrained by consistency alone.
3. Following Schlick, the established view coheres with a common understanding
of Poincare´’s conventionalism.
Defenders of the established view may lean upon Poincare´’s repeated insistence
that axioms are definitions in disguise, constrained only by non-contradiction, and
that they are conventions. How else can this be understood than in accordance with
the established view? Accordingly, axioms are definitions in disguise in the sense
that they implicitly define the concepts of point, line, plane, etc. by characterizing
a relational structure among terms, which then must be coordinated with the world
by appropriate conventions.
In Science and Value Poincare´ argues that applied geometry concerns neither
synthetic a priori judgments nor experimental facts. It does not concern synthetic
a priori judgments because it is possible to imagine experiences that would lead
us to deny some of the axioms of Euclidean geometry, and it does not concern
experimental facts because it is an exact science. He concludes that the claims of
applied geometry are conventional:
They are conventions. Our choice among all possible conventions is guided by experimental
facts; but it remains free and is limited only by the necessity of avoiding all contradiction.
Thus it is that the postulates can remain rigorously true even though the experimental laws
which have determined their adoption are only approximate.
In other words, the axioms of geometry (I do not speak of those of arithmetic) are merely
disguised definitions (Poincare´, 1905, p. 65)
Understood in the following way, this characterization of the axioms of geometry
accords with a view commonly associated with Hilbert. Axioms are possible con-
ventions because they are schematic and are to be coordinated to empirical reality by
conventional definitions. A “line” may be a rail track or a ray of light, and a “point”
may be a rail station or a star.3 Using the inferential relations encoded in the axioms,
we form abstract mathematical concepts of point, line, etc. as places in an abstract
structure, but there is no privileged, intuitive interpretation according to which the
truth or falsity of the axioms is to be assessed. Accordingly, axioms provide implicit
definitions of general concepts, and are only apparent assertions about objects.4
3 Hilbert is credited with having said of geometric terms that “One must be able to say ‘tables,
chairs, beer mugs’ each time in place of ’points, lines, places’,” (Blumenthal, 1935, p. 402-403).
4 A great deal has been written about Hilbert’s view in his Grundlagen der Geometrie, the rela-
tionship between this view and the modern model theoretical understanding of axioms, and Frege’s
response to Hilbert in their correspondence. A reviewer points out that an appeal to Fregean second-
order concepts can accommodate Hilbert’s method, because axioms, understood as implicit def-
initions, define classes of structures. This proposal is discussed in William Demopolous’s essay
“Frege, Hilbert, and the Conceptual Structure of Model Theory” (Demopoulos, 1994, p. 219). Pa-
tricia Blanchette has argued that Frege, while failing to adequately appreciate Hilbert’s method and
the new sense of ‘consistency’ that method involved, does succeed in articulating a sense in which
Hilbert fails to demonstrate the consistency of denying the parallel postulate: viz., when that postu-
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In the context of the established view, good sense is made of the fact that
Poincare´, like Hilbert in his correspondence with Frege, emphasized that consis-
tency was the only constraint on mathematics, stating that “a mathematical entity
exists, provided its definition implies no contradiction, either in itself, or with the
propositions already accepted” (Poincare´, 1905, p. 60). Such passages may incline
one to assimilate Poincare´’s views on the foundations of geometry to Hilbert’s and
to analogize the Hilbert-Frege and Poincare´-Russell polemics. For, the claim that
mathematics is constrained only by consistency may seem naturally to be under-
stood in a framework that prioritizes axiomatization over genetic intuitions, because
a property naturally ascribed to sets of sentences or propositions, viz. consistency,
is given priority over intuition as a criteria of existence.
Lastly, it may also be contended that Poincare´’s famous non-falsifiability argu-
ments for geometrical conventionalism are only to be understood in the context of
the established view. Any axiom system for geometry can be adopted and held to
come what may, making compensating changes to other theories should anomalous
observations occur. Accordingly, geometrical axioms must be conventions because
of their non-falsifiability in practice. The relational structure encoded in the implicit
definition is non-falsifiable for the system to which the definitions are coordinated,
and hence it is conventional.
3 A Revised Interpretation
Notwithstanding the support available for the established view, I will argue in what
follows that it leads us to neglect important distinguishing features of Poincare´’s
view of the foundations of geometry, that the sense in which axioms are disguised
definitions differs for Poincare´ from Hilbert’s sense, that Poincare´’s conventionalism
can only be restricted to geometry (rather than implying a more radical Duhem-
Quine style holism) if the established view is rejected, and that Poincare´’s and
Hilbert’s equal emphasis on consistency is circumstantial.
The central feature of the established view is the treatment of geometrical ax-
ioms as schematic rather than assertoric. According to the revised interpretation
of Poincare´’s views on geometry that I wish to advance, geometric axioms are as-
sertions about points and lines, which are defined prior to axiomatization by what
Poincare´ calls “invariant” sub-groups (in modern parlance: “normal” sub-groups).
This interpretation allows us to see Poincare´’s views on the foundations of geometry
as intimately related to his mathematical practice and to his emphasis on the impor-
tance of group theory. While the established view may be fully articulated without
late is understood as expressing a Fregean thought (Blanchette, 1996). The motivation for Frege’s
resistance to Hilbert’s approach, and to regarding geometry as a branch of logic like arithmetic,
has been traced to his experience with 19th century geometry, beginning with (Wilson, 1992) and
further developed in (Tappenden, 1995). I discuss Frege’s position that geometry is semantically
founded on reference to particulars presented in sensible intuition in my “Frege on the Foundation
of Geometry in Intuition” (Shipley, 2015).
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mention of group theory, the revised interpretation gives central place to Poincare´’s
insistence that geometry is the study of the properties of certain groups.
Poincare´’s claim that geometry is the study of a group makes its first appearance
in his reputation-making mathematical work on Fuchsian functions, produced in
1880. In a supplement to the prize essay submitted to the Acade´mie des Sciences in
Paris he states:
It [geometry] is the study of the group of operations formed by the displacements to which
one can subject a body without deforming it. In Euclidean geometry the group reduces to
the rotations and translations. In the pseudogeometry of Lobachevski it is more complicated
(Poincare´, 1997, p. 14).
The primary concern of this work is differential equations rather than geometry and
its foundations, and these early comments do not receive full philosophical articu-
lation. Geometry arises in the course of studying and classifying functions that are
solutions to second order differential equations having specified properties.5 The
key to Poincare´’s discoveries in the field of Fuchsian functions was his realization
that the transformations employed in the definition of Fuchsian functions form a
group that is isomorphic to the group employed in the definition of the hyperbolic
geometry of Lobachevsky, leading him to the analogy “the Fuchsian function is to
the geometry of Lobachevsky what the doubly periodic function is to that of Euclid”
(Poincare´, 1997, 15). In a text originally composed in 1901 and later published in
Acta Analytica in 1921, Poincare´ emphasizes the fundamental role of group the-
ory by asserting an analogy between his work on solutions to classes of differential
equations and Galois’ work on the solution of polynomials by radicals (Poincare´,
1983, 259). According to the interpretation that I am arguing for, Poincare´’s philo-
sophical commitments in the foundations of geometry are intimately related to his
formative mathematical experience and to a broader view of mathematics.
Groups play a fundamental role in Poincare´’s more philosophical account of the
conventions we employ in order to categorize and control the changes that occur in
our perceptual stimulus presented in his 1898 article “On the Foundations of Geom-
etry” published in The Monist. Note well that the form of a group of operations that
is imposed in categorizing sensible changes as displacements does not, in Poincare´’s
view, depend in any way on the qualitative character of the sensible changes. It is,
rather, strictly formal and it’s properties can be studied formally. Poincare´ writes:
We have now to study the properties of the group. These properties are purely formal. They
are independent of any quality whatever, and in particular of the qualitative character of the
phenomena which constitute the change to which we have given the name displacement. We
remarked above that we could regard two changes as representing the same displacement,
although the phenomena were quite different in qualitative nature. The properties of this
displacement remain the same in the two cases; or rather the only ones which concern us,
the only ones which are susceptible of being studied, are those in which quality is no wise
concerned (Poincare´, 1898, p. 13).
5 For details see John Stillwell’s helpful introduction and the primary texts (Poincare´, 1985) as
well as Jeremy Gray’s commentary accompanying the further texts (Poincare´, 1997).
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Continuing, Poincare´ defines and discusses the notion of isomorphism, and the idea
that the formal properties of a group are what are studied by mathematics. For ex-
ample, the group of permutations of five cards is isomorphic to the group of per-
mutations of five marbles; the qualitative difference between cards and marbles is
irrelevant to mathematics. Similarly, all that matters to mathematical geometry are
the formal properties of the group of displacements.
The structure of a group affords the definitions of the straight line and of the point
given in the Monist article. Poincare´ arrives at the notions of “point” and “line” in an
entirely group theoretically driven way. The rotative subgroup is prior in conception
to the point, which is conceived only as that which is fixed by the rotation, and the
rotative sheaf, defined by taking the common displacements of two rotative groups,
is prior in conception to the line, which is conceived as the axis that is fixed by a
rotation: “Here [the with the rotative sheaf] is the origin of the notion of the straight
line, as he rotative sub-group was the origin of the notion of the point.” (Poincare´,
1898, p. 20). Poincare´ insists that although the idea of a rotative group is suggested
by sensation, it is conceived in a purely formal manner by the understanding, so
that our reasoning may become precise.6 There is a genuine ambiguity in the text.
Poincare´ refers to the rotative sub-group and sheaf as, respectively, the “origin” of
our notions of point and line. I will not take a position on how to interpret this. On
one interpretation the points and lines just are the sub-groups. According to another
interpretation, points and lines are parts of an amorphous, continuous manifold,
which are invariant under the action of the sub-groups in question.7
4 Definitions in Disguise
This brings us to the first pillar of support for the established view. What sense can
be made of Poincare´’s claim that geometrical axioms are “definitions in disguise” if
the established view is abandoned? Is there a tension between the view of axioms
as definitions in disguise and the definition of points and lines as group invariants?
In fact, keeping in mind that Poincare´ gives prior and independent definitions of the
primitive terms occurring in geometric axioms can help us to better understand what
he means when he says that axioms are definitions in disguise, and how his intended
meaning differs from the view that has been attributed to him.
For Poincare´ the claim that axioms are definitions in disguise does not mean
that the axioms are themselves definitions that are disguised as assertions. Rather,
6 This repeats a theme in Poincare´’s work, wherein vague, inaccurate, or even inconsistent ideas
are suggested by sensation then made precise and consistent through mathematical reflection. His
discussion of Fechner’s account of the subjective continuum and its precisification in mathematical
understanding, for example, follows this pattern (Poincare´, 1905, p. 22).
7 Because of this ambiguity, and because I take no position on the correct interpretation, I have
not commented on the status of Poincare´’s analysis situ in this paper. However, there is evidence
in his review of Russell’s Essay On the Foundations of Geometry that in the 1890s he conceived
of analysis situ, like metrical and projective geometry, as founded on a group of transformations
(Poincare´, 1899, §19)
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axioms are definitions in disguise because they disguise the definitions that imply
them. One reason to adopt this interpretation is that it allows us to make the claims
about axioms and definitions cohere with the plainly stated definitions of “point” and
“line” given in “On the Foundations of Geometry” (the 1898 Monist article) and to
make sense of the consistently insisted upon priority of group theory. However, the
reasons for adopting this interpretation are not exclusively indirect, and in fact there
is strong textual evidence for this way of viewing things. When read in full context
it is clear that while Poincare does, of course, say that axioms are definitions in
disguise, he does not mean that axioms implicitly define mathematical concepts;
rather, he means that there are correct definitions that imply the axioms, which are
disguised when we treat the axioms as primitive.
In Science and Hypothesis the claim that axioms are “disguised definitions”
comes in the summation of Ch III, and is presented as an alternative way to state that
the axioms of geometry “are neither synthetic a priori judgments nor experimental
facts,” but rather are “conventions” (Poincare´, 1905, p. 65). We shall return to the
relevance of the revised interpretation that I am arguing for to the proper understand-
ing of Poincare´’s conventionalism shortly, but for now I wish to focus attention on
passages which precede these widely cited quotations, which I claim will help us
better understand the statement that axioms are definitions in disguise.
In a section of Ch III titled “The Implicit Axioms” Poincare´ begins with the
question “Are the axioms explicitly enunciated in our treatises the sole foundations
of geometry?” The answer implied by the ensuing discussion is plainly “no.” There
are unenunciated “implicit axioms” that are implied by the correct definitions of
geometrical entities. It is important to stress that Poincare´ holds clearly that there are
correct definitions of geometrical entities in this section of Science and Hypothesis
and that these definitions, which entail the implicit axioms, are the same as those
given in “On the Foundations of Geometry”:
“It may happen that the motion of a rigid figure is such that all the points of a line belonging
to this figure remain motionless while all the points situated outside of this line move. Such
a line will be called a straight line.” We have designedly, in this enunciation, separated the
definition from the axiom it implies.
Many demonstrations, such as those of the cases of the equality of triangles, of the
possibility of dropping a perpendicular from a point to a straight, presume propositions
which are not enunciated, for they may require the admission that it is possible to transport
a figure in a certain way in space (Poincare´, 1905, p. 62).
Contrary to the view that Poincare´ held that the usual axioms provide implicit defini-
tions of geometric concepts, Poincare´ is here articulating (less than perfectly clearly,
it must be admitted) the same view that he holds in “On the Foundations of Geome-
try”, that we obtain concepts like “point” and “line” as invariant elements of group
actions; these are what determine the possibility of transporting figures. He writes
that affirming the existence of a certain group of operations “constitutes the axioms
of Euclid” (Poincare´, 1898, p. 18). Indeed, I do not think that these passages of
Science and Hypothesis can support the claim that Poincare´ rejects the traditional
demand for nominal definitions. Poincare´ is, rather, insisting that the nominal defi-
nitions that have traditionally been given are inadequate, and need to be replaced by
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definitions that constitute geometrical objects based on the conventional assumption
of a chosen group; this “true definition” is not an implicit definition in the sense of
Schlick.
5 Consistency
So much for the first pillar of support for the established view. We have seen that
the revised interpretation of Poincare´’s foundation of geometry that axioms are def-
initions in disguise can equally well, if not better, account for the relevant texts.
Accordingly, axioms are not definitions in disguise because they themselves im-
plicitly define their terms, but rather because they disguise the definitions which
imply them. We turn now to the second support for the established view: viz., that
it makes the best sense of Poincare´’s concurrence with Hilbert that mathematics is
constrained only by non-contradiction. To better understand Poincare´’s view on this,
we should situate his thinking on the foundations of geometry in relation to Kant’s.
A clear agenda of Poincare´’s Monist article is to vitiate Kant’s account of the
origin of geometry in a single synthetic a priori form of sensibility and to replace
that account with a theory of the origin of geometry in the understanding. Impor-
tantly, Poincare´’s proposal for doing this conceives of forms of the understanding
as groups of operations rather than discursive concepts. That Poincare´ opposes the
account of geometric notions as originating in sensibility, either empirically or tran-
scendentally, is clear from page 1 of the essay:
Our sensations cannot give us the notion of space. That notion is built up by the mind
from elements which pre-exist in it, and external experience is simply the occasion for its
exercising this power, or at most a means of determining the best mode of exercising it.
Sensations by themselves have no spatial character (Poincare´, 1898, p. 1).
The remainder of the essay is devoted to articulating an alternative, based on the
claim that “we have within us, in a potential form, a certain number of models
of groups, and experience merely assists us in discovering which of these models
departs least from reality” (Poincare´, 1898, p. 13), which form “the common patri-
mony of all minds” (Poincare´, 1898, p. 18).
Now, on the established view we can well understand how geometry could be
founded in the understanding rather than sensibility. Accordingly, geometry con-
cerns relations between what Kant called “discursive concepts”, which are con-
strained only by the law of non-contradiction but which, according to Kant, as
empty linguistic forms thus lack “objective validity.”8 Though it is a bit anachro-
8 Early in the transcendental aesthetic, Kant denies that space is a “discursive concept” (Smith,
1929, B37). According to Kant, the process of geometrical object construction by the productive
imagination is governed and restricted by space as a form of sensibility. The formation of concepts
in the understanding is restricted only by the law of non-contradiction, but some non-contradictory
concepts, such as that of a figure closed by two straight lines, are nevertheless concepts of impos-
sible objects. They lack objective validity. Kant distinguishes between “form of thought”, which
has a purely logical significance, and the conditions for the possibility and necessity of objects
10 Jeremy Shipley
nistic, I think it is not entirely misleading to assimilate Kant’s “discursive concepts”
or “forms of thought” to Schlick’s implicit definitions. Hilbert’s claim that the only
constraint on mathematics is the law of non-contradiction, that in mathematics exis-
tence means non-contradiction, can be read in this context as rejecting the Kantian
standard for objective validity and that any consistent axiomatization may have a
corresponding model freely postulated. Recalling that Poincare´ makes similar state-
ments to Hilbert’s concerning consistency and existence, ought we not, as the sec-
ond pillar of the established view has it, interpret him in the same way, and ought
we to after all attribute to Poincare´ a view that gives axiom schemata and implicit
definition a central role?
An alternative, non-discursive, interpretation of Poincare´’s view of the role of
non-contradiction is available, which better accords with his insistence on group
theoretical foundations of geometry and with algebraic methods that Poincare´ cele-
brated as fundamental to the advance of mathematics in the 19th century.9 I wish to
distinguish the question of the consistency of an extension of a system of operations
from the question of the consistency of a set of propositions. On the one hand, if
we understand the claim that mathematics is constrained only by non-contradiction
as applying to consistency in the latter sense, then we are lead naturally to Hilbert’s
view and to the axiomatic method as a mode of definition of mathematical concepts,
which may be considered as discursive concepts in Kant’s sense; we just drop the
constraint of objective validity and its association with transcendental conditions of
sensory representation.
Alternatively, we may view consistency as restraining the freedom we have
in postulating extensions of groups of operations. Treating consistency as a con-
straint on extending systems of operations, rather than on the acceptability of axiom
schemata as implicit definitions, allows one to understand the consistency constraint
in a way that harmonizes well with Poincare´’s description of the development of
number systems beginning with basic arithmetic. Therein, we take for granted an un-
derstanding of the operation +1 and use this understanding to define further opera-
tions by recursion, through a “monotonous series of reasonings” (Poincare´, 1905, p.
36). It is in this context that Poincare´ makes his controversial remarks regarding the
non-reducibility of the principle of recursion to the principle of non-contradiction,
a claim which he maintained would preclude a complete logicist reduction of math-
ematics. Our purpose is not to evaluate this claim, however, but to better understand
Poincare´’s general way of thinking about the foundations of mathematics, and his
remarks well accord with the view that he considered consistency to be the con-
straining factor on the process of extending systems of operations. For it is this
of thought, which concerns experience and its synthetic unity (Smith, 1929, B267). To determine
that a concept is of a possible object of thought, it is necessary but not sufficient to show that it
is non-contradictory. Sufficiency demands, further, that a concept must satisfy the conditions for
the possibility of experience. The point is made nicely, by Michael Friedman (Friedman, 1990, p.
216-218) who references the following passages: (Smith, 1929, B271) and (Smith, 1929, B298-9).
See also (Smith, 1929, B151-2) and (Smith, 1929, B196) for more on objective validity and the
relationship between concepts formed in the understanding and the forms of sensibility through
construction by the productive imagination.
9 See (Poincare´, 1983, 259), which is discussed above.
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constraint that we know to be unviolated by “the power of the mind which knows
itself capable of conceiving the indefinite repetition of the same act when once this
act is possible” (Poincare´, 1905, p. 39).
We may bring this discussion of Poincare´’s view of the foundations of arithmetic
into connection with his discussion of the operations that form the groups at the
foundation of geometry by reflecting on the following passage, which introduces
the section of “On the Foundations of Geometry” that is concerned with rotative
sub-groups:
The number of sub-groups [of the group of all displacements] is infinite; but they may be di-
vided into a rather limited number of classes of which I do not wish to give here a complete
enumeration. But these sub-groups are not all perceived with the same facility. Some among
them have been only recently discovered. Their existence is not an intuitive truth. Unques-
tionably it can be deduced from the fundamental properties of the group, from properties
which are known to every body, and which are, so to speak, the common patrimony of all
minds. Unquestionably it is contained there in germ; yet those who have demonstrated their
existence have justly felt that they had made a discovery and have frequently been obliged
to write long memoirs to reach their results.
Other sub-groups, on the contrary, are known to us in much more immediate manner.
Without much reflexion every one believes he has a direct intuition of them, and the affir-
mation of their existence constitutes the axioms of Euclid. Why is it that some sub-groups
have directly attracted attention, whilst others have eluded all research for a much longer
time? We shall explain it by a few examples (Poincare´, 1898).
There are two ideas to draw from this passage that speak in favor of the revised
interpretation. First, in general support of the revised interpretation, the conceptual
priority of groups of operations is affirmed by the claim that the axioms of Euclid are
constituted by the existence of a group. Second, in support of the present reflections
on the consistency constraint, the passage strongly suggests the foundational impor-
tance of research into groups and their subgroup structure, which I would suggest
is best understood on the model of Poincare´’s view of the foundations of arithmetic
in the following way: a “germ” is developed through the repetition and combina-
tion of generating operations 10 I elaborate on this idea, and the relationship the
way groups may be defined and some of Poincare´’s broader commitments regarding
proper definition below.
In the light of the role that the consistency constraint has for Poincare´ that I
have been developing, we can see how consistency can have been important for him
without relying on the established view that he took axioms to be schemata and
to function as implicit definitions. Specifically, consistency constrains the construc-
tion of forms of the understanding by restricting the introduction of generators or
relations either primitively or to extend existing groups.
10 Compare the “monotonous series of reasonings” characteristic of arithmetic and the “long mem-
oirs” on the classification of groups. Poincare´’s impatience with this sort of work, as an “intuitive
mathematician”, should not be read as a dismissal of its foundational importance. See (McLarty,
1997) for more on Poincare´’s view of rigor.
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6 Conventionalism
So much for the second pillar supporting the established view. I turn now to the
third pillar: that the established view lends to a nice account of Poincare´’s conven-
tionalism. Schlick’s interpretation of Poincare´, as we have detailed above, makes
natural sense of his conventions in the following way: conventions coordinate terms
in implicit definitions to real objects, properties, and relations. The main problem
for the established view concerning the interpretation of Poincare´’s conventionalism
is that it leads to a difficulty in saying why we should be, as Poincare´ held, conven-
tionalists about geometry in particular, rather than about other sciences. For, if our
conventionalism derives from that fact that once terms occurring in axiom schemata
are coordinated with reality, the schemata may be held to come what may then the
same can be done for fields besides geometry, such as kinematics.
As Michael Friedman has argued, only an appeal to the priority of group theory
in Poincare´’s hierarchy of sciences can make sense of why he was a conventionalist
about spatial geometry and not kinematics:
Now Poincare´’s conception of geometry is also very similar to the Kantian conception of ge-
ometry. For Poincare´, as for Kant, geometry is synthetic, because it is based, like arithmetic,
on the possibility of indefinitely repeating particular operations: namely, group-theoretical
operations constituting a Lie group of free motions. Moreover, geometry is viewed as the
presupposition of all empirical physical theories: neither for Poincare´ nor for Kant can ge-
ometry itself be either empirically confirmed or empirically disconfirmed. The difference,
of course, is that Poincare´, in contrast to Kant, is acquainted with alternative geometries.
Poincare´ is acquainted, in particular, with the Helmholtz-Lie theorem, according to which
geometry is constrained, but by no means uniquely determined, by the idea of a Lie group
of free motions. It then follows for Poincare´ because three alternative possibilities are still
left open, that we have here—in this very special situation—a conventional choice or free
stipulation (Friedman, 1997, p. 312).
There is a long story to be told about the relationship between Poincare´’s hierar-
chical view of science and his restricted conventionalist thesis. A full telling is
beyond the scope of the present discussion, but it suffices to concur with Fried-
man that the revised interpretation is better situated than the established view to
make sense of why Poincare´’s conventionalism is restricted to geometry and does
not tend toward more radical versions of confirmational holism based on the con-
tention that any proposition may be held onto in the face of apparently contradictory
evidence, as endorsed for example by Quine (Quine, 1951). According to the estab-
lished view of Poincare´’s conventionalism, geometry is conventional because it is
non-falsifiable. To block falsification one simply handles anomalies by altering the
kinematics. However, the relationship between geometry and kinematics is symmet-
rical on this account. Should we choose to stubbornly adopt a theory in kinematics,
we could resist falsification by making compensating changes to our geometry. On
the revised interpretation, geometry is non-falsifiable because it is conventional, a
choice of a group must be made before empirical science can proceed.
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7 Defining Groups
I have argued that, as with arithmetic, Poincare´ understood groups to be generated
by potentially indefinite iteration of a generating element. In the case of discrete
groups, this may be done by specifying generators and relations. In the case of
continuous groups, we need infinitesimal generators. It may be objected that this
approach, after all, leans on implicit definitions, given the formalist character of
group presentations. However, even if it is granted that group theory in general rests
on implicit definition, the definitions of the terms contained in the typical axioms
of geometry would not be implicitly defined. In fact, there is good reason to think
that Poincare´ would want implicit definition to be restricted to the algebraic set-
ting, given his comments on definition in his later works. In an essay contained in
the collection Dernie`res Pense´es, Poincare´ distinguishes two cases of what he calls
“definition by postulate”, which may plausibly be considered to be implicit defi-
nitions. The case which is objectionable to the “pragmatist” and accepted by the
“Cantorian” occurs when an object is defined implicitly by a postulate which relates
it to an infinity of elements in a supposedly given domain. However, this form of
definition is acceptable to the pragmatist when an element is defined by its rela-
tion to objects in a finite domain (Poincare´, 1963, p. 69-71). Katherine Dunlop has
pointed to these passages to argue that Poincare´ cannot succeed in founding geome-
try on group theory in a way that does not run afoul of his restrictions on definition,
because “a group is characterized by the existence of an identity element that bears
a specified relation to every object in the group” (Dunlop, 2016, p. 303). However,
when a group is presented by a finite set of generators and their relations, only the
relation of the generators to the identity must be stipulated, and the universal gener-
alization to all elements can be proven by an inductive argument. On the other hand,
axioms of geometry, taken as implicit definitions, would run afoul of this constraint
on definitions (and worse); for, they aim to simultaneously define infinitely many
points and lines by simultaneously stipulating relations to other objects in the same
infinite set.
Furthermore, I would contend that Poincare´’s account of indefinite repetition and
continuity, both of which will be involved in constructions from infinitesimal gen-
erators, appeal only to a kind of intellectual intuition, and not, as Janet Folina has
argued, to Kantian forms of sensible intuition (Folina, 1992, p. 35-36, p. 134-135,
p. 180-181). Poincare´’s views on these matters are, however, subtle and possibly
shifted in his later texts in ways that are favorable to Folina’s reading. A competent
and complete engagement with Folina’s thorough treatment of Poincare´’s views is
beyond our present scope. If Folina’s view is correct then there is an ineliminable
appeal to forms of sensibility that is required to adequately define the groups and
sub-groups that we have been discussing. While this undermines the position that
Poincare´ rejects forms of sensibility and founds mathematics entirely on forms of
the understanding, which is the strongest view I am inclined to endorse, it leaves un-
touched my core contention that group theory is prior in conception to to the axioms
of geometry.
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8 Poincare´ and His Contemporaries
A recurring theme of this paper has been the comparison of Poincare´’s and Hilbert’s
images of mathematics. According to the established view there is little difference
between the two on geometry, with the primary difference comes in Poincare´’s
proto-intuitionist view of arithmetic and the irreducibility of arithmetic induction
to logic.11 According to the view espoused in this paper, Poincare´ held that group
theory was the foundation of both arithmetic and geometry. Arithmetic concerns the
important special case: the infinite cyclic group, otherwise known as the integers.
The groups that constitute the forms of the understanding, however, include contin-
uous groups with the invariant subgroups that constitute the points and lines about
which axioms assert truths. In each case, the construction of these forms occurs
through the mind’s power to adjoin and combine operations.
Poincare´, to be sure, well appreciated the power of the model theoretic methods
employed by Hilbert in his Grundlagen der Geometrie, and praised them in his re-
view. Poincare´ especially praised the usefulness of Hilbert’s work for breaking down
the bias of geometers toward thinking that there is a “general geometry”, with Eu-
clidian, Lobachevskian, and Riemannian geometry as special cases. Hilbert’s early
model theoretic approach effectively demonstrated that it was not only the parallel
postulate that could be regarded as logically independent:
But why, among all the axioms of geometry, should [the parallel postulate] be the only
one which could be denied without offense to logic? Whence should it derive this privi-
lege? There seems to be no good reason for this, and many other conceptions are possible
(Poincare´, 1903, p. 2).
In particular, Hilbert’s approach to independence proofs demonstrates the exis-
tence of non-Pascalian and non-Desarguesian geometries. Throughout the review,
Poincare´ demonstrates a clear understanding of Hilbert’s methods and an admira-
tion for the results obtained, but does this indicate agreement with the view that the
supposedly basic terms of geometry are defined contextually by implicit definitions?
I think that the answer is clearly “no”, and this is shown by Poincare´’s conclud-
ing remarks from the review. There, Poincare´ again emphasizes the group theoret-
ical standpoint. First, he notes that, according to Hilbert, “The objects which he
calls points, straight lines, or planes become thus purely logical entities which it is
impossible to represent to ourselves,” but he does not endorse this view (Poincare´,
1903, 22). Rather, he criticizes Hilbert for neglecting the group theoretic definition
of these terms, and in particular for failing to note that the non-Pascalian geome-
tries that Hilbert studies may be generated from geometric groups in a way that is
analogous to the generation of metrical geometries. The passage culminates in the
following criticism:
Professor Hilbert seems rather to slur over these inter-relations; I do not know why. The
logical point of view alone appears to interest him. Being given a sequence of propositions,
he finds that all follow logically from the first. With the foundation of this first proposition,
11 A nice discussion of the relationship between Poincare´ and full-fledged Brouwerian intuitionism
can be found in Folina’s book Poincare´ and the Philosophy of Mathematics (Folina, 1992, p. 73-74)
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with its psychological origin, he does not concern himself. And even if we have, for ex-
ample, three propositions A, B, C, and if it is logically possible, by starting with any one
among them, to deduce the other two from it, it will be immaterial to him whether we regard
A as an axiom, and derive B and C from it, or whether, on the contrary, we regard C as an
axiom, and derive A and B from it. The axioms are postulated; we do not know where they
come from; it is then as easy to postulate A as C (Poincare´, 1903, p. 22)
If Poincare´ held the view that in geometry axioms are arbitrary postulates that im-
plicitly define geometric terms, then this criticism would make no sense. The crit-
icism only makes sense if, as I have argued, Poincare´ holds that there is a correct
account of where the axioms come from, and this account, as should by now be
manifestly evident, requires that the terms contained in the axioms of geometry
have proper definitions. According to Poincare´ there are non-logical criteria for the
correct ordering of propositions in mathematics.
While the Poincare´-Russell polemics have been commonly interpreted as par-
alleling the Hilbert-Frege correspondence, the orthogonality between Poincare´ and
Hilbert is in fact previsioned in his review of Russell. Coffa in particular, regards
Poincare´ as having rejected the thesis of “semantic atomism”, according to which
the terms contained in a sentence must have prior meanings that must be properly
combined for the sentence to express a proposition (Coffa, 1993, p. 131). If this is
right, then there is indeed a parallel between Frege’s insistence that the axioms of
geometry must be assertions about objects that are given in intuition and Russell’s
supposed semantic atomism.12 However, if Poincare´ is rejecting semantic atomism
then there cannot be correct definitions of the terms “point” and “line”, as the 1898
Monist article articulates, that imply the axioms, as described in Science and Hy-
pothesis.13
In fact, Poincare´’s agenda in Des Fondaments de Geometrie, the review of Rus-
sell’s 1897 book An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, is entirely consonant
with his agenda in his review of Hilbert. Firstly, he wishes to disavow Russell of
the view that there is a core geometry, based on the axioms of projective geom-
etry, that is grounded in sensible intuition. This is precisely the sort of view that
Poincare´ praises Hilbert for disproving by demonstrating the logical possibility of
non-Pascalian and non-Desarguian geometries through model theoretical methods
(though, again, Poincare´ thought these methods were incomplete because they did
not show the origin of these geometries in group theory). Russell’s contention, in
the 1890s, was that projective geometry rested on a Kantian foundation in sensible
intuition and consisted of synthetic a priori truths, but that metrical geometry was
empirical.
It is true that Poincare´ savagely criticizes Russell’s position that the basic terms
of projective geometry refer to objects given in sensible intuition, by pointing out
12 I think that there are complications with the interpretation of Russell’s views in the 1890s im-
plicit in Coffa’s commentary, but I limit myself here to correcting the record on Poincare´.
13 See my discussion above in the section titled “Definitions in Disguise”. Notably, the 1898 ar-
ticle was written prior to the publication in 1899 of Poincare´’s review of Russell’s book on the
foundations of geometry. Poincare´’s view of geometry as founded in groups theoretical forms of
the understanding was motivated by his early mathematical work and held consistently through his
writings.
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the vagueness and imprecision of Russell’s definitions and axioms (Poincare´, 1899,
§2-4), but this only shows that Poincare´ rejected the foundation of geometry in sen-
sibility. As I have argued, his alternative was not a foundation of geometry in dis-
cursive concepts defined implicitly by the axioms in which they occur, but rather
in group theory as a form of the understanding. Indeed, the group theoretical per-
spective is what Poincare´ insists on, and not the rejection of semantic atomism, in
presenting his alternative to Russell (Poincare´, 1899, §19). Poincare´ wants to dis-
avow Russell of the view he praises Hilbert for dislodging, that there is a universal
geometry (for Russell, projective geometry), but he wants to do so by convincing
Russell of the priority in conception of the form of the group, which he criticizes
Hilbert for neglecting.
There is a clear affinity between Poincare´’s view and that of Klein and Lie, ex-
pressed in the Erlangen program. Indeed, there was interaction between Poincare´
and Lie in 1882 when Lie was in Paris. Lie wrote to Klein that Poincare´ held the
concept of a group to be the fundamental concept for all of mathematics (Hawkins,
2000, p. 182). Jeremy Gray notes that it is very likely that Poincare´’s use of groups
in his analysis of Fuchsian functions was independent of Klein’s Erlangen program
(Gray, 2005, p. 551). It is not clear whether Klein or Lie ever indicated anything like
Poincare´’s philosophical view that the group is prior in conception to the terms oc-
curring in the axioms of geometry. Poincare´’s position is that group theory defines
those terms, that the objects to which they refer are constituted by invariant sub-
groups, but an alternative view would be that the objects of geometry are presented
or constructed independently while groups afford a complete means of classification
without necessarily constituting the objects that comprise the spaces thus classified.
This view is consistent with a mathematical interest in the use of groups to classify
geometries, but inconsistent with Poincare´’s fully developed philosophical position.
9 Conclusion
This paper has been focused on correctly articulating Poincare´’s views on the foun-
dations of geometry. Accordingly, he held that geometry is founded on group the-
ory, in such a way that the terms “point” and “line” receive proper definitions by
reference to invariant subgroups. This interpretation sheds light on Poincare´’s gen-
eral philosophy of mathematics. For, group theory, as the study of forms of the un-
derstanding, has the same foundation as arithmetic. While Poincare´ has sometimes
been read as having a disjointed view of mathematics, a kind of quasi-logicist view
of geometry as grounded in axiomatic implicit definitions together with a quasi-
intuitionistic view of arithmetic, we can now see that there is a deep unity in his
vision of mathematics.
Should this matter to contemporary philosophers of mathematics, or is getting
Poincare´’s view right a matter of historical curiosity? I think that, for good reason,
philosophers have been fascinated with the notion of mathematics as a science of
structure, or logical form, which can be associated with the concepts that are artic-
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ulated through axiomatic definitions. This has given rise to a very interesting litera-
ture in the mataphysics of mathematics, on whether structures must be understood
as ante rem or in re, what the relationship between structures and sets might be, and
many more questions. So it may seem that revisiting a neo-Kantian view from the
turn of the 20th century holds limited interest. From this perspective, one may even
find that my interpretation of Poincare´ in fact diminishes his legacy as anticipating
the structuralist turn, based on the axiomatic method, in his writings of the 1890s.
However, while the importance of the axiomatic point of view to the development
of mathematics in the 20th century is undeniable, and the understanding of math-
ematics as advancing through the logical derivation of theorems from axioms, that
is as a system of discursive reasoning, certainly has great philosophical importance,
the focus on discursive reasoning limits our perspective on the nature of mathemat-
ical reasoning, on mathematical experience, and potentially on the very nature of
the mind and intelligence. Poincare´’s unified image of mathematics, derived from
his own mathematical experience, beginning with his work on Fuchsian functions,
which produced germinal contributions to mathematical knowledge, begins with an
account of non-discursive reasoning. Mathematicians are masters of more than the
rules of logic, and a complete account of mathematics will involve accounting for
both discursive and non-discursive reasoning, as well as the relationship between
the two. Correctly understood, Poincare´’s account of the foundations of geometry
offers a neglected contribution to this philosophical project.
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